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 Abstract
 
 We establish a theory to analyze how initial conditions of organizational differences in transition 
economies affect reform strategies, especially the "big-bang" approach in Eastern Europe and former 
Soviet Union economies as the U-form and the "experimental" approach in China as the M-form. We 
model the coordination of specialized tasks inside an organization as "attribute matching" and compare 
organizational forms (U-form and M-form) in coordinating reforms.  Organizational forms affect the 
information structure of an organization and thus the way to coordinate reforms.  Compared to the U-
form, the M-form organization achieves better coordination but suffers from higher costs due to a lack of 
scale economies.  The M-form has a distinctive advantage in carrying out experimentation that it is more 
flexible in reforms.  
                                                 
    1 We are grateful to Wei Li, Paul Milgrom, Dani Rodrik, Oliver Williamson, and the participants at the 
Fifth Nobel Symposium in Economics for helpful discussions and comments.  Roland and Xu benefitted 
from an ACE grant and Roland benefitted from a fellowship at the Center for Advanced Studies in 
Behavioral Sciences at Stanford in 1998-99. 
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I.  Introduction 
 Gradual and experimental are often characterized as a major feature of The Chinese reform to 
differentiate those in formal Soviet Union (FSU) and Central Eastern Europe (CEE). This popular 
argument claims that China has followed an experimental approach whereas Eastern Europe and the 
former USSR followed the "big bang" strategy after 1989. China's reforms first started in experiments in 
agriculture and then moved into experiments in special economic zones in cities.2  However, some 
experimental reforms were introduced in the Soviet Union in the 1980s but failed. It is on this basis, the 
experimental approach to reforming a planned economy has been discredited and abandoned during the 
later transition.  The Eastern European radical transition came after deep troubles or failures of many 
years of gradual reforms with experimental approaches.  Ironically, to a large extent, China followed 
many of the Eastern European gradual reform measures including experiments in earlier stages of its 
reforms.  In fact, the Hungarian reform started in 1968 with some initial success, but then ran into 
difficulties in the 1980s.  A very important, but tends to be neglected fact associated with the failures of 
the CEE-FSU earlier reforms, is their economic stagnation for the decade of 1980s before the radical 
changes since 1990.  According to official statistics, the average growth rate of GDP in Hungary was 
1.8% between 1981 and 1985 and almost zero in 1988 and 1989.  In Poland, the average GDP growth rate 
was less than 2% between 1981 and 1989.3 Reform should not be based on experiments is a conclusion or 
a lesson drawn by many economists from the failures of the experimental reforms in CEE-FSU 
economies.  Therefore, a proper question to be raised is, why has experimental approach worked in China 
but not in Eastern Europe?     
 In this paper, we propose a theory, which opens new perspectives on understanding how the 
 
    2 For related literature, see Singh (1991), McMillan and Naughton (1992), Dewatripont and Roland 
(1997), Sachs and Woo, 1997. 
    3 Data source for Hungary and Poland is from Table 9.1 of Kornai (1992). 
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differences in organizational forms of centralized economies in the Soviet Union and China affected their 
reforms and transition paths. It allows us to address the following question: what makes China succeed in 
applying experimental approaches whereas CEE-FSU economies failed in experimental approaches in 
reforms?   
 The central point of our theory is that different organizational forms differ in their coordination 
capacity.  How do organizational forms of a centralized economy or organizational forms inside 
government affect economic reform strategies in transition economies?  What is the difference between 
coordinating changes in a unitary (centralized) state with specialized ministries and in a federal state with 
coordinating powers delegated to regions? What is the difference between coordinating innovation in a 
business firm run by specialized departments and in a firm that is run by self-contained profit centers?  
 To answer these questions, we introduce the concept of task coordination inside an organization 
as matching the attributes of specialized tasks in a stochastic environment, which is inspired by Milgrom 
and Roberts (1992).  We view coordination as reforming an economy by restructuring enterprises and 
establishing corresponding social safety-net; synchronizing travel plans and accommodating logistics for 
a conference, etc.  Each complementary part is characterized by its attributes: time, location, technical 
specifications (such as size, weight, and bits), legal and administrative terms, etc.  A reform program or a 
product is completed successfully only if the characteristics of each attribute of the various parts are 
matched.   
 In a world without uncertainty, as long as an organization has a perfect plan in which all the 
attributes are matched by design, all the tasks can be implemented without a problem.  Alternatively, as 
long as all agents are able to communicate perfectly (no mistakes, no cost, no time) matching attributes 
will not be a problem either even when there is uncertainty.  However, when there are exogenous random 
shocks which we will call "attribute shocks" and when communication between agents is imperfect, the 
coordination problem becomes non-trivial and having a perfect plan alone is insufficient.  This is because 
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when there is a shock affecting an attribute of one task, any change of this attribute will affect its 
matching with attributes of other tasks.  Thus, the corresponding attributes of other tasks must be adjusted 
to make them match.  But the quality of the adjustment of attributes depends itself on the quality of 
communication inside an organization.  The communication problem arises because only a manager 
directly and frequently engaging in a particular task has first-hand information and knowledge about that 
task.  Communication is necessary for others to use such information and knowledge, but communication 
is likely to be imperfect because message transmission, due to technical bugs as well as human 
misunderstanding, can go wrong.  Hayek's (1945) famous notion of "local information," the information 
about particular location and circumstance, fits well our framework – direct involvement in a task gives 
rise to good knowledge about that task. The communication problems we consider are more general, they 
are not necessarily related to geographic distance.  They arise whenever direct involvement is absent there 
is poor knowledge.  For convenience, we often refer to a manager as "local manager" and the knowledge 
he possesses as "local information." Thus, the term "local" used here does not necessarily carry a 
geographical meaning.  
 However, the communication problem is endogenous, depending on how tasks and decision-
making power are assigned within an organization, that is, the organizational form.  We define an M-form 
(multi-divisional form) organization as one that consists of self-contained units where complementary 
tasks are grouped together.  In contrast, a U-form (unitary form) organization is decomposed into 
specialized units where similar tasks are grouped together.  These units are not self-contained in terms of 
final output.  Because the M-form and the U-form organizations assign tasks differently, the 
communication problems they will face are different.  
 Our definition of M-form and U-form organizations helps us to characterize the striking 
difference between the organization of the Soviet planning administration and that of the Chinese 
planning administration (Qian and Xu, 1993).  We may regard a centrally planned economy as a huge 
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"firm" with the national government as the headquarters and ministries or subnational governments as 
sub-units of the firm.  From this perspective, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union (EEFSU) 
economies were organized as a gigantic U-form (also known as a "branch organization"), where state-
owned enterprises were organized into many specialized or functional ministries (e.g., mining, machinery, 
textile, etc.), each controlling gigantic factories.   On top of that, there was a high degree of regional 
industrial concentration.4  This central planning structure makes central coordination essential: In the late 
1970s the Gosplan, which supervised all specialized ministries, was responsible for 48,000 plan 
"positions" and 12 million products (Nove, 1983).  
 In contrast, the Chinese economy has been organized mainly on a geographical principle 
(provinces, prefectures, counties, townships and villages).  This corresponds to an M-form organization 
(also known as a "regional organization"), where most state-owned enterprises were under the control of 
regional governments.  At the same time, industries were much less regionally concentrated than the 
EEFSU and the average size of Chinese enterprises was much smaller too.  Typically, the production of 
each region was relatively self-contained.  With regional governments taking major responsibilities for 
coordination, the central government's role of coordination was greatly reduced compared to that in the 
EEFSU.  The Chinese State Planning Commission was never responsible for more than 1,000 products 
(Qian and Xu, 1993), and the central statistical agency in China had total staff of only 280 (in 1981), 
compared to 41,000 in the Soviet Union (in 1987) (Huang, 1994).5
 
    4 In the Soviet Union, for example, a large number of consumer goods and producer goods (e.g. sewing machines, 
freezers, hydraulic turbines, and 87 percent of all the 5,885 products in machine building industry) had only a single 
producer located in one geographic area.  In 1988, about two thirds of all the products had no more than three producers 
(IMF et al., 1991, Vol. II, pp.39-40). 
    5 We further note that the different organizational forms between China and the EEFSU is not due to the different 
sizes of the corresponding economies.  In fact, China's central statistical agency was even smaller than that in Hungary, 
which is about 100 times smaller than China in terms of population.  A comparison between Hungary and a small 
Chinese province, Hainan, may further illustrate the point.  Hungarian ministries controlled most of the firms before the 
transition.  However, the control of firms in Hainan is distributed at different levels of hierarchy, although Hainan is 
smaller than Hungary, in terms of both population and GDP. 
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 The M-form structure provides flexibility and allows for regional experiments without interfering 
with the rest of the economy, and thus can optimally induce an experimental approach.  The difficulties in 
coordination prevent the U-form from exploiting this strategy.  In the latter, reforms must be more 
comprehensive in order to avoid coordination failure and must be coordinated from the top.   
 According to our theoretical analysis, the introduction of reforms (be they reforms within the 
central planning system or market-oriented reforms) in the EEFSU requires a comprehensive approach 
with coordination from the center.  On the other hand, in China, reforms can proceed with local 
experiments, or even parallel experiments, because coordination is established locally.  Indeed, plagued 
by many coordination problems, many previous reform experiments in the EEFSU were not successful.  
In contrast, China repeatedly adopted successfully an experimental approach to reforms.  
 In order to focus on the coordination problem, we assume away the incentive problem and take 
the team theoretical approach. Elsewhere, Maskin, Qian, and Xu (1999) provide an analysis of incentive 
problems in M-form and U-form organizations in a similar setup.  They have demonstrated that different 
organizational forms give rise to different information about managers' performance and therefore differ 
according to how incentives encourage good performance.  In particular, they have shown that the M-
form may provide better incentives than the U-form because it promotes yardstick competition, that is, 
relative performance evaluation, more effectively.  In this paper, we assume that managers under either 
organizational form have the same incentives to pursue the goal of economic efficiency.  That is, there is 
no intrinsic advantage of one organizational form over another from the point of view of incentives.  
Therefore, all results are driven by coordination considerations. 
 In our theoretical model we made a symmetry assumption with two industries in each region.  
However, in reality, China and the Soviet Union had different patterns of industrial centralization on top 
of the organizational form.  In China, because of regional industrial dispersion, the M-form (regional-
based) and the U-form (industrial-based) represented two different potential organizational forms and the 
Chinese adopted the former.  In the Soviet Union, the initial U-form organization led to extreme industrial 
concentration where one region had only one industry.  In that case, regions are not self-contained any 
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more which means that the properties of the M-form cannot be obtained simply by devolution of powers 
to the regions.  The initial choice of organizational form thus had an impact on location and size of 
industry.  In the Soviet Union, these choices represented a "lock-in" of the U-form, making a change 
towards the M-form impossible without major indsutrial investment.  This consideration also clarifies the 
confusion arising frequently in studying the Soviet Union and Russia.  It is often thought that the 
devolution of authority to regional governments under Yeltsin in Russia after 1992 represents a shift from 
a U-form to an M-form.  This is not true.  In fact, such a change represents a shift from a U-form, as we 
have studied, to a "collapsed" U-form, which is equivalent to a U-form where the communication between 
local and central managers has completely broken down.  This is because when industries are regionally 
concentrated and cannot be moved around easily, regions cannot be self-contained units as in the case of 
China. 
 We extend the analysis by introducing another dimension of the coordination problem, that of 
"attribute compatibility."  Attribute compatibility is a characteristic related to similar tasks and products.  
Whereas attribute matching refers to complementary tasks such as manufacturing and sales of cars, 
compatibility refers to serving different types of cars.  Cars have a better compatibility if different types 
share common services or parts.  When coordination for attribute compatibility between similar tasks is 
also needed, the M-form may suffer from coordination problems due to imperfect communication 
between the local managers and the top manager, since in the M-form similar tasks are performed in 
different units.  Then the comparison between the M-form and the U-form is focused on the tradeoff 
between two types of coordination: attribute compatibility and attribute matching.  When standardization 
in markets is more prepared to solve most of the compatibility problems, the M-form will have more 
advantages than the U-form. 
 Our paper is, to our knowledge, the first to formalizing coordination as attribute matching. 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) introduced the notion of design attributes to study the form of 
communication (prices or planned attributes) that should be used to coordinate a given decision. They 
find that non-price communication is optimal when errors of "fit" are very costly and the number of 
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alternative possible designs that fit well is large. Unlike our study, Milgrom and Roberts focus only on 
the form of communication and do not consider the choice of alternative management structures to 
organize decisions when the need for attribute matching is pervasive.   
 Moreover, to our knowledge, our model is the first formal attempt at studying how the M-form 
and the U-form organizations affect communication channels and thus the efficiency of coordination 
within an organization. 6  After the presentation of formal theory, we give applications to three areas: 
business firms, transition economies, and the organization of government. 
 Our theory is also relevant to the study of business firms.  Becker and Murphy (1992) have 
emphasized that coordination costs limit the extent of specialization in organizations but do not compare 
the coordination capacity of various organizational forms.  Chandler (1962, 1977) studied how the M-
form corporation emerged and how it replaced the U-form to become the prevailing corporate form of 
large businesses in U.S. business history.  Williamson (1975, 1985) theorized Chandler's works with two 
major focuses: the holdup problem and the overload problem of corporate headquarters.  The holdup 
problem concerns how organizational forms affect incentives and contractual relationships within an 
organization.7  With respect to the coordination problem, Williamson emphasized that M-form firms were 
more efficient than U-form firms because daily operations were decentralized to divisions, which reduced 
 
    6 The literature related to our work includes team theoretical studies of organization and management science 
literature. Team theory literature, among others, includes Marschak and Radner (1972) on the economic theory of 
teams, Weitzman (1974) on coordination using price and quantity, Crémer (1980) and Aoki (1986) on the optimal 
partition of workshops inside an organization, and Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) on the firm as a communication 
network. Related management science literature distinguishes between product-focused and process-focused 
corporations, and treats them as the result of minimization of coordination costs in varying unstable environments 
(Henderson and Clark, 1990, Hayes, Wheelwright, Clark, 1988, Stinchcombe, 1990, Athey and Schmutzler, 1994).  
Other related literature includes comparative studies of firms, for example, Aoki (1986) has noted that in Japanese 
firms, decision-making is more decentralized to workers who are less specialized and better able to make frequent 
adjustments and use on-site information than their American counterparts.  These models, however, are not based on 
the notion of coordination as attribute matching. 
    7 A large literature has been generated after Williamson, such as Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore 
(1990). 
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work overload at the corporate headquarters and freed their time for strategic planning.8  However, if 
overload is the only problem, putting more staff and resources in the headquarters and in functional 
departments should reduce the problem, and there is no need to undergo a reorganization process.  
Chandler (1962, 1977) documents that this is not the case.  Our theory is consistent with Chandler's cases 
showing how the design of communication channels within an organization has fundamental effects on 
coordination. 
 Finally, our theory is useful in understanding the organization of government, specifically, the 
comparison between the unitary and federal state.  The unitary state can be viewed as a U-form 
organization and federalism as an M-form.  The organization of the French and Japanese governments are 
examples of the former and that of the United States is the prominent example of the latter.  The French 
and Japanese government organizations are much more centralized in Paris and Tokyo respectively, with 
specialized ministries having large powers and regional governments having little.  Major changes in 
government programs, such as education and banking reforms, require initialization by the responsible 
ministries and coordination by the central government.  In contrast, American federalism is known as a 
"laboratory of the states," in the famous words of the American Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis 
written in 1932.  Indeed, many government policy changes in the U.S. are experimented by some states 
and the successful results are imitated later by others.  The contrast between the unitary and federal states 
fits well in our theoretical analysis of organizational forms. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II introduces basic concept of task 
coordination as "attribute matching" and sets up the model.  Section III explores the basic features of the 
U-form and the M-form organizations in coordinating reforms.  Section IV extends the model to include 
the possibility of parallel reform experiments when more than one blueprint is available at a given time.  
Section V incorporates coordination on attribute compatibility.  Section VI applies our theory to explain 
 
    8 Aghion and Tirole (1995) analyzed how M-form and U-form organizations generate and solve the overload 
problem. 
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reform strategies in China and in former Soviet Union. Section VII discusses other applications of our 
theory in business and in political science.  Section VII concludes.  The Appendix contains the proofs of 
the propositions. 
 
II.  Modelling Coordination as "Attribute Matching" 
 The coordination concept in this paper relates to the adjustment of the organization to 
exogenous disturbances and random contingencies.  This concept expresses the idea that a need 
for coordination arises in response to exogenous disturbances to pre-set plans.  We look at task-
coordination decisions.  There are usually many attributes of a set of tasks required to produce a 
product or to provide a service: time, location, technical specifications such as size, weight and 
bits, etc.  A product or a service is completed only if characteristics of each attribute among a set 
of tasks are matched ("attribute fit," as referred to by Milgrom and Roberts, 1992).  When there 
is a shock affecting an attribute in one task, the attribute in other tasks must be adjusted to 
achieve matching. There is a fundamental difference in the nature of these two basic adjustment 
decisions.  Adjusting to attribute shocks means preserving the complementarity between tasks.  
Adjusting to attribute compatibility means organizing the substitution of resources among tasks 
so as to preserve optimal resource allocation. 
 Consider an economy with two regions (or products), "A" and "B," and two functions (or 
processes), "1" and "2."  The technology of the economy can be fully described by four tasks: 1A, 2A, 
1B, and 2B, where task ir involves process i for product r.  With this specification, we assume that the 
two products (or regions) are symmetric in the sense that each region has two functions. 
 We suppose that a reform program is designed so that all attributes are matched perfectly ex ante 
in the blueprints.  However, in implementing a program, there are always "attribute shocks" which are 
unexpected contingencies not taken care of in the blueprints.  At the implementation stage of a reform 
program, attributes of sub-programs must be mutually adjusted to observed attribute shocks.  We assume 
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that attribute matching must take place between tasks 1r and 2r (r = A, B).  In sections III and IV, we 
assume that no attribute matching is needed between the tasks across regions and in section V, we extend 
the model by incorporating the requirement for attribute compatibility across regions. 
 We consider an infinite horizon with discount factor δ.  We first assume that one and only one 
blueprint for change is available in each period to the top officer of the organization.  Later we allow the 
possibility of two independent blueprints in each period.  With probability p the blueprint is a good one 
and with probability 1-p it is bad.  Blueprints available over time are stochastically independent.  We 
assume that if a blueprint is known to be good, then it will be good in the same unit (region) in the future, 
or it can be good in another unit (region).  In contrast, good coordination (i.e., attribute matching) in one 
unit (region) cannot be "copied" in another unit (region), because of differences in local conditions.  
Therefore, if a blueprint tried in one unit (region) is found to be good and coordination has been 
successful, then the same blueprint can be used successfully elsewhere, but coordination is still necessary 
in order to adjust to local conditions before a successful outcome can be achieved. 
 We assume that the officer of a unit has better "local" information about his unit than others.  
Thus, the effectiveness of corresponding adjustments will be determined by the quality of communication 
among the agents who are responsible for the related tasks.  Moreover, we assume that communication 
within a unit is perfect, but cross-unit communication is imperfect.  This is because when activities are 
shared by members of a unit they share local information and they communicate extensively with a 
common language (it can take many formats such as jargon, graphs, body language, etc.) which reduces 
misunderstandings.  However, communication across groups is imperfect.  This is because when agents 
are in separate specialized units, they have different idiosyncratic knowledge and different interpretations 
of the same message.  They may speak different languages (e.g., engineering language differs from 
marketing language and the language of economists may differ from that of sociologists).  Moreover, 
their communication may be restricted to short messages (such as messages carried by phone calls, faxes, 
memos, meetings, etc.), which may be subject to ambiguous interpretations. 
 A superior is specialized in supervising subordinate units and communicates with the units more 
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often.  However, units are not specialized in communicating with each other.  We assume that the center 
receives imperfect information about shocks in all units but there is no horizontal communication between 
units.  In this sense, a superior has better "global" information about all units than his subordinates do. 
 We model these differences in information in reduced form by assuming that in each period, if 
needed, a officer collects information about the attribute shocks and, if required, sends a message to 
another officer.  Each message contains information about all the attributes in one task.  We assume that 
the probability of each message being correct is λ with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.  We assume that noises in information 
transmission are independent across tasks as well as over time.  Based on the information received, the 
officer carries out his main job: attribute matching. 
 Consider the payoffs for unit A (payoffs for unit B are defined symmetrically).  Let the status quo 
(without change) payoff in tasks 1A and 2A be 1/2.  The benefits from change are defined as follows.  
Suppose the program is good, then (i) with change in task 1A but not in task 2A (or change in task 2A but 
not in task 1A), the payoff is (R+1)/4 if the attributes between 1A and 2A are matched, otherwise 0; and 
(ii) with changes in both tasks 1A and 2A, the payoff is R/2 if the attributes between 1A and 2A are 
matched, otherwise 0.  If the program is bad, then the payoff is always 0 when change is implemented.   
 
Assumption 1.  pR > 1: the expected per-period benefit from change is larger than the status quo. 
 
 We assume that all blueprints are made available for free, but for each officer there is a setup cost 
C associated with coordinating changes.  This cost can be interpreted as a training cost, that is, to 
implement a program for change the officers need to be trained on how to match attributes of the 
program.  Because blueprints are free and the setup costs for coordination are not, when a failure occurs 
in the previous period (either due to a bad program or bad coordination), the organization always prefers 
to use a new blueprint in the next period rather than retry the old one. 
 
Assumption 2.  R/2(1-δ) - C > 1/2(1-δ), that is, the net benefit from change is better than the status quo 
for p = 1. 
 
 We can now define U-form and M-form organizations.  A U-form organization is set up along 
"functional lines."  Two middle officers i (i = 1, 2) are responsible for collecting information about shocks 
in tasks iA and iB.  Because the two tasks that need attribute matching are not assigned to the same 
middle officer, the two middle officers have to report the information to the top officer, who, after 
receiving information from the two officers, matches attributes between tasks 1r and 2r (r = A, B).  This 
type of organization can be represented by Figure 1: 
Figure 1.  An U-form Organization
Task 1A Task 1B
Ministry
function 1
Task 2A Task 2B
Ministry
function 2
Central Government
 
 
 An M-form organization is set up along "regional lines."  The middle officer r (r = A, B) is 
responsible for collecting information about shocks in tasks 1r and 2r.  Because the two tasks which 
require attribute matching are assigned to the same officer, the middle officers can match attributes 
between tasks 1r and 2r locally by themselves.  The top officer provides a blueprint for change (and in 
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section V, the top officer also coordinates attribute compatibility).  This type of organization can be 
represented by Figure 2: 
Figure 2.  An M-form Organization
Task 1A Task 2A
Region A
Government
Task 1B Task 2B
Region B
Government
Central Government
 
 
 Under the M-form, setup costs must be incurred in each unit since attribute matching is done 
separately in each region unit.  This leads to higher setup costs.  For example, both officers need to be 
trained to coordinate the changes.  In contrast, under the U-form, only the top officer matches attributes in 
a centralized way.  Therefore, the setup cost is correspondingly smaller.9  For simplicity, we will assume 
that only one setup cost is required when only one officer coordinates. 
 We provide two examples below to illustrate our concept of coordination inside an organization 
as attribute matching. 
 
                                                 
    9 We note that in this framework, the M-form has an option to "mimic" the U-form by requiring regional managers to 
send messages to the top for coordination, but the U-form cannot "mimic" the M-form.  However, when coordination 
on compatibility is added into the model in section V, the two organizational forms will look symmetric. 
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Example 1.  Coordinating innovations: manufacturing trucks 
 Suppose there are two functions to produce trucks.  Function 1 consists in supplying many types 
of bearings to the truck industry, and function 2 consists in manufacturing trucks.  Because of differences 
in local road conditions, each region has its idiosyncratic preference for truck models (call them model A 
and model B trucks respectively).  Task 1r is to produce bearings for a model r truck, and task 2r is to 
produce model r trucks for region r, where r = A and B. 
 The attributes of bearings and truck models should be matched to each other in order to produce 
quality trucks.  For example, the bearings should match the transmission equipment of the truck.  If some 
attributes between the bearings and the truck are not matched, the truck cannot be made.  Coordination 
consists in finding a solution to match bearings with parts of trucks.  A technological innovation in 
transmission may make a truck more efficient, but it will change the technical requirements for bearings. 
 Suppose there is an innovation in the transmission system and the innovation outcome is 
uncertain.  In the case where a new transmission system is good and every set of bearings is matched with 
every part of a truck, the new truck will be better than the old one.  However, if one of the bearings does 
not fit with the corresponding part of the truck, the new truck will not work. 
 The firm can be organized into specialized units, a machine-building unit and a unit for producing 
bearings, with centralized matching of the attributes between bearings and trucks (U-form).  It can also be 
organized along regional lines, where each region is responsible for producing one truck model (the M-
form). 
 
Example 2.  Coordinating reforms: enterprise restructuring and creation of a social safety net 
 Suppose an economic reform consists of two components: enterprise restructuring (laying off 
excess workers) and creation of a social safety net.  Task 1r is layoffs in region r and task 2r is paying 
unemployment benefits through the social safety net in region r, where r = A and B. 
 The attributes of enterprise restructuring are the number and individual characteristics of the laid-
off workers, such as age, seniority, family composition, length of residence, sex, type of contract, current 
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wage, history of employment, etc.  The attributes of compensation from the social safety net are rules of 
eligibility, such as length of employment, special circumstances (veteran or not), status of enterprises, 
rules of benefits such as size and length, types of benefits (monetary or not), technical support of 
computers, administration, budget, etc.  If some attributes of the two tasks are not matched, some laid-off 
workers may not be compensated appropriately. 
 If the reform is organized by specialized ministries (or committees), then each ministry is 
responsible for either enterprise restructuring or the social safety net, and the national government is 
responsible for matching the attributes between enterprise restructuring and the social safety net (the U-
form).  It is possible that there will be bad coordination between layoff policies and the creation of the 
social safety net, leading to riots.  For example, the rules for eligibility set at the national level may be 
completely inappropriate in some important regions which have a concentration of older workers, if the 
national rule for pension eligibility does not make workers close to pension age eligible for any benefits. 
 If the reform is organized by the regions, each regional government is responsible for matching 
the attributes between enterprise restructuring and the social safety net in its own region (the M-form).  
Under this type of organization, layoff policies and the institution of social safety nets can be better 
coordinated within each region so that riots can be prevented. 
 
III.  Coordination, Experimentation, and Organizational Flexibility 
 In this section, we compare the M-form and the U-form assuming that only one blueprint is 
available in each time period.  Under both organizational forms, the payoff from the status quo (i.e., no 
reform) is 1 for each period, and thus the status quo discounted payoff is 1/(1-δ). 
 Consider first the situation in which an organization starts a reform in both of its units and 
continues in that way afterwards.  Under the M-form, every unit officer will be responsible for matching 
the attributes of the two tasks within his unit.  With perfect local information, attribute matching under the 
M-form will be performed perfectly.  If a program is good, which happens with  probability p, the total 
payoff from the two units is R/(1-δ).  If a program is bad, which happens with probability 1-p, the current 
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payoff is zero, and a new program will be tried in the next period.  Therefore, the expected payoff of 
continued reform in an M-form is  
 πm2 = pR/(1-δ) + (1-p)δπm2, 
from which we obtain 
 πm2 = pR/{(1-δ)[1-(1-p)δ]}. 
 On the cost side, in period 1, 2C is paid because two officers are involved in coordination.  With 
probability p, the program is good so no more costs need to be paid afterwards.  But with a probability 1-
p the program is bad, which is discovered after one period of change.  Then a new program is tried in the 
next period.  Because the officers need to be retrained for matching attributes, an additional cost of 2C is 
paid in the next period, and so on.  Therefore, we should have 
 cm2 = 2C + δ(1-p)cm2,  
from which we derive 
 cm2 = 2C/[1-(1-p)δ]. 
 Under the U-form, the top officer is responsible for coordinating the four tasks.  He thus receives 
four messages through noisy communication, each corresponding to one of the four tasks.  When the 
program is bad (with probability 1-p), the innovation fails, and a new program will be tried in the next 
period.  If the program is good (with probability p), there are three possibilities:  (i) With probability λ4, 
coordination is successful for both regions A and B.  (ii) With probability (1-λ2)2, coordination fails in 
both A and B.  This will give the same outcome as a bad program.  (iii) With probability 2λ2(1-λ2), 
coordination for one of the two regions is successful.  In this case, knowing that the program is good, the 
top officer will use the same program for the region for which the coordination failed and solve only the 
attribute matching problem in the next period.  Hence, the payoff of reform under the U-form is 
 πu2 = p{λ4R/(1-δ) + 2λ2(1-λ2)[R/[2(1-δ)] + δπ] + (1-λ2)2δπu2} + (1-p)δπu2, 
where π is the expected payoff of change for one region for a good program:  
 π = λ2R/[2(1-δ)] + (1-λ2)δπ, 
which implies that 
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 π = λ2R/{2(1-δ)[1-(1-λ2)δ]}. 
Using the above recursive formula of π, we obtain 
 πu2 = p{2λ2[λ2R/2(1-δ) + (1-λ2)R/2(1-δ) + (1-λ2)δπ + (1-λ2)δπ - (1-λ2)δπ]/{1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]} 
 = 2p[λ2R/2(1-δ) + λ2(1-λ2)δπ + (1-λ2)δπ - (1-λ2)δπ]/{1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]} 
 = 2pπ[1 - (1-λ2)2δ]/{1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]} 
 = λ2pR[1-(1-λ2)2δ]/{(1-δ)[1-(1-λ2)δ][1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]]}. 
 On the cost side, when a reform is introduced in period 1, only a setup cost C is paid (instead of 
2C in the M-form) because only the top officer matches attribute.  With probability 1-p the program is 
bad, which is discovered after one period.  With probability p(1-λ2)2 the program is good but coordination 
fails for both regions.  In both cases, a new program is tried in the next period.  When the program is good 
and coordination is successful for at least one of the two regions, the program will be known to be good.  
In such a case, no new setup cost needs to be paid in the next period.  Indeed, the top officer has already 
been trained for that program and he has been able to successfully coordinate attribute matching for one 
region.  Under this assumption, we have: 
 cu2 = C + δ[p(1-λ2)2 + (1-p)]cu2, 
from which we obtain 
 cu2 = C/{1-[p(1-λ2)2+1-p]δ}. 
 
Lemma 1:  (1) πu2 ≤ πm2, and πu2 increases in λ and reaches πm2 at λ = 1. 
(2) cu2 decreases in λ, and cu2 < cm2 if and only if δ(1-p+2p(1-λ2)2) < 1. 
 
 When communication between the middle officers and the top officer is perfect, the two 
organizational forms are equivalent in the expected payoffs.  However, when communication is not 
perfect and because there is no communication problem under the M-form, M2 always has a higher 
expected benefit than U2.  Under U2, costs decrease with λ because better communication decreases the 
probability of failure with change, thereby lowering the probability of drawing new experiments and 
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incurring repeated setup costs.  The trade-off between costs under M2 and U2 is also related to the quality 
of communication under U2.  The latter avoids the costs of duplication but bad communication leads to a 
higher failure rate, possibly leading to higher total costs because of the need to draw more experiments 
before achieving success. 
 We define the expected net payoff under the M-form and U-form, respectively, 
 M2 = πm2 - cm2, 
and 
 U2 = πu2 - cu2. 
 
Proposition 1:  Comparing the M-form and the U-form: 
(1) the M-form has a higher expected net benefit than the U-form if communication quality (λ) is low 
enough: for p and C given, there exists λ ∈ (0,1) for which M2 > U2 if and only if λ < λ. 
(2) the U-form has a higher expected net benefit than the M-form if the setup cost (C) is high enough: 
when cu2 < cm2 and for p and λ given, there exists C > 0 such that U2 > M2 and if only if C > C. 
 
 Proposition 1 formulates the basic tradeoff between coordination and scale economies in 
implementing changes under the M-form and the U-form.  The U-form has an advantage in scale 
economies because the top officer is responsible for coordination in the entire organization.  The 
organization thus saves on setup costs but the U-form has disadvantages in coordination because local 
information is communicated imperfectly from the local officers to the top officer.  In contrast, the M-
form has better coordination because officers can make better use of local information for coordination 
purposes, but it suffers from disadvantages in scale economies: it pays twice the setup costs because two 
local officers are responsible for attribute matching instead of one top officer.10  In view of this trade-off, 
                                                 
    10 In Bolton and Farrell (1990) it is coordination failure (in the context of multiple equilibria) that creates duplication 
costs.  In our model, coordination is defined as attribute matching inside an organization while the duplication of setup 
costs is related to the lack of scale economies or specialization (on the latter point, see also Becker and Murphy (1992)). 
 Here, there is no causality between coordination failure and the duplication of setup costs. 
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the M-form will be more efficient than the U-form when communication quality is relatively low, or 
when the setup cost is relatively small. 
 We next introduce the possibility that an organization starts a program for change in one of its 
two units and later extends it to another unit, conditional on successful implementation in the first unit.  In 
other words, we look at the possibility of experimentation in implementing changes. 
 Under the M-form, suppose at first that a program is introduced in unit A whereas the status quo 
is maintained in unit B.  If the program is a good one, the first period payoff is (R+1)/2.  In the second 
period, the same program is then used in unit B.  From then on, the payoff is always R per period.  
However, if the program is bad, the experimenting unit A will get 0 payoff and the non-experimenting 
unit B will get 1/2.  In this case, a new experiment in unit A will take place again in the next period.  
Therefore, the expected payoff of the M-form with experimentation is given by 
 πm1 = p{R/2(1-δ) + 1/2 + δR/2(1-δ)} + (1-p){1/2 + δπm1}, 
that is,  
 πm1 = p[R+(1-δ)+δR]/2(1-δ) + (1-p){1/2+δπm1}. 
Therefore, we obtain 
 πm1 = [pR(1+δ)+(1-δ)]/{2(1-δ)[1-(1-p)δ]}. 
 The setup cost in the first period is C because only unit A's officer does attribute matching.  If the 
program is good, unit B will use the same program in period 2 and another cost C will be paid in period 2 
because unit B's officer needs to match attributes according to local conditions.  Unit B thus imitates unit 
A's success, but does not copy it, since local coordination is still required to introduce the successful 
blueprint.  With probability 1-p, the program is bad and a new blueprint must be tried. We are then back 
to the situation of period 1.  Hence we get, 
 cm1 = C + δ[pC + (1-p)cm1], 
which implies that 
 cm1 = (1+pδ)C/[1-(1-p)δ]. 
 We define the net expected payoff under the M-form with an experimentation strategy as 
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 M1 = πm1 - cm1. 
 Because of Assumption 1, pR > 1, we have: 
 
Lemma 2:  (1) πm1 < πm2, and cm1 < cm2. 
(2) dM2/dp > dM1/dp > 0. 
 
 Both the expected net benefits under M1 and M2 monotonically increase with p.  By Lemma 2, we 
can define pm2* as the probability such that M2 = 1/(1-δ) and pm1* as the probability such that M1 = 1/(1-
δ), where 1/(1-δ) is the status quo payoff.  Then, for all p > pm1*, M1 has higher expected net payment 
than the status quo; and for all p > pm2*, M2 has higher expected net payment than the status quo.  Let p 
be the probability such that M1 = M2.  The following proposition compares two reform strategies in the 
M-form: experimentation and non-experimentation or immediate full change (innovation introduced in 
both units simultaneously).   
 
Proposition 2:  (1) pm1* < pm2* < p < 1.  That is, M1 > M2 if and only if the uncertainty p < p, and 
experimentation dominates the status quo while immediate full change does not for p ε (pm1*, pm2*). 
(2) for p given, experimentation yields a higher expected net benefit if and only if setup cost C > C = (pR-
1)/2(1-pδ). 
 
 Proposition 2 demonstrates the following tradeoff.  Experimentation provides an option value of 
waiting to learn about the quality of the blueprint before implementing the full program for change, but it 
comes at the cost of delaying a successful full change in the whole organization.  The difference in the 
expected net benefits between experimentation and immediate full change under the M-form is given by  
 M1 - M2 = {C(1-pδ)-(pR-1)/2}/[1-δ(1-p)]. 
The first term C(1-pδ) in the numerator indicates the option value of waiting to learn about p before 
sinking C in an additional unit.  This option value of waiting increases as p decreases, i.e. when there is 
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greater uncertainty about the value of the blueprint.  Therefore, experimentation can save on setup costs 
because of the option value of early reversal of a bad blueprint (Dewatripont and Roland, 1995).  The 
second term in the numerator (pR-1)/2 (which is positive by Assumption 1) shows the cost of delaying 
experimentation in one unit under M1.  This cost increases with p.  Clearly, when p = 1, M2 > M1 since the 
numerator becomes C(1-δ)-(R-1)/2, which is smaller than zero by Assumption 2.  M2 continues to 
dominate M1 until p falls below p.  In particular, when p falls further into the region of [pm1*, pm2*], M1 is 
greater than the status quo but M2 is not. 
 We now analyze the possibility of experimentation under the U-form.  Without loss of generality, 
we assume that at first a blueprint is implemented in unit 1 whereas unit 2 maintains the status quo.  In 
line with our assumptions, the top officer does the attribute matching for regions A and B. 
 We assume that the quality of the program (good or bad) can be discovered even when the change 
is implemented for only one task.  We further assume that in order to match attributes of two tasks, 
whenever there is a change in at least one task, information (and thus communication) about the attributes 
of both tasks is needed.  This is because even if a change is introduced in one task, attribute matching 
always involves another task.  Therefore, under U-form with change in only one unit, all messages 
corresponding to the four tasks must be communicated by the two middle officers to the top officer. 
 After one period of experimentation in one unit, if a program is bad, the innovation fails, and in 
the next period a new program will be tried.  If a program is good, there are three possible outcomes:  (i) 
With probability λ4 attribute matching is achieved for both regions A and B.  Then in the next period, the 
same program is used in both units and the final payoff will only depend on the outcome of attribute 
matching.  (ii) With probability (1-λ2)2, coordination is bad for both A and B.  This will give the same 
outcome as a bad program and a new program will be tried in the next period.  (iii) With probability 
2λ2(1-λ2), coordination for A or B is successful which will reveal that the program is good.  In the next 
period, the two units will use the same program and the payoff for the earlier failed region will depend on 
the outcome of attribute matching.  Hence, the expected payoff of the U-form with experimentation is 
 πu1 = p{λ4[(R+1)/2 + δ2π] + 2λ2(1-λ2)[(R+1)/4 + δ2π] + (1-λ2)2δπu1} + (1-p)δπu1, 
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where π is, as above, the expected payoff of reform in one region when the program is good, as defined 
above.  Hence, we obtain 
 πu1 = p{λ4[(R+1)/2 + δ2π] + 2λ2(1-λ2)[(R+1)/4 + δ2π]}/{1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]}. 
  Under the U-form, the setup cost is the same as reform without experimentation. This is because 
coordination is done at the top and always requires four messages to be sent to the top officer who must 
be trained to do the appropriate coordination.  We also assume that the setup cost C enables the officer to 
implement both partial and full change.11  Therefore, 
 cu1 = cu2 = C/{1-[p(1-λ2)2+1-p]δ}. 
 We define the net expected payoff under a U-form with experimentation as 
 U1 = πu1 - cu1. 
 
Proposition 3:  Under the U-form, experimentation is always dominated by immediate full change: 
 πu1 < πu2, cu1 = cu2, and U1 < U2. 
 
 The U-form organization does not benefit from experimentation because of the complications 
involved in coordinating activities.  While the setup cost is not lower as with full change, there is no 
additional benefit in coordination and there are only costs in delaying expected benefits. 
 Since partial innovation in the U-form never occurs in equilibrium, it is useful to give an 
example.  Think of changes in computer software where task 1 represents change in the operating system 
and task 2 change in a word processor.  Experimentation under U-form in this case means, for example, 
first changing the operating system (from DOS to windows 95), and then changing the word processor 
(from WordPerfect 5.1 to WordPerfect 8).  In this example, partial innovation involves first matching the 
attributes of the old word processor with the new operating system (via a solution like the "DOS prompt") 
                                                 
    11 It would be reasonable to assume that the setup cost should be incurred twice, a first time when partial innovation 
is tried and a second time when the full innovation is implemented since the nature of the coordination is different in 
both cases.  This assumption would however only reinforce the result of proposition 3. 
  
 
 23 
and then matching the attributes of the new operating system with the new word processor.  In terms of 
difficulty of coordination, one gains nothing from this partial innovation and one might just as well 
directly introduce both changes.  This is the message of proposition 3. 
 The flexibility of the M-form yields an advantage over the U-form: 
 
Proposition 4:  (1) the U-form has higher expected net benefits than the M-form if the quality of 
communication λ is close enough to 1. 
(2) Experimentation under the M-form yields higher expected net benefits than immediate full change 
under either M-form or U-form if the quality of communication λ is small enough and either p < p or C > 
C = (pA-1)/2(1-pδ). 
 
 When communication quality is high, the U-form will dominate because of its advantages in scale 
economies.  The more interesting results are those on the flexibility of the M-form.  From Propositions 2 
and 3 we know that when the probability of success is low or the setup cost is high, the M-form has the 
option of experimentation while experimentation has no value to the U-form.  In such a case, the M-form 
can do better than the U-form, provided communication quality is low enough. 
 
IV.  Coordination and Parallel Experimentation 
 In this section we assume that two independent blueprints are available at a given time.  This 
introduces a possibility that both blueprints are tried simultaneously in two units in the M-form, yielding 
net benefits denoted M11.  If there is one successful experiment in one unit, it can be copied costlessly in 
the other unit, as in the previous section.  Under this strategy: 
 πm11 = p2R/(1-δ) + 2(1-p)p{R/2(1-δ) + δR/2(1-δ)} + (1-p)2δπm11, 
from which we obtain: 
 πm11 = {R(p2+p(1-p)(1+δ))}/(1-δ)[1-δ(1-p)2]. 
Similarly for the cost: 
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 cm11 = 2C + 2(1-p)pδC + (1-p)2δcm11, 
from which we obtain: 
 cm11 = 2C[1+δp(1-p)]/[1-δ(1-p)2]. 
 
Lemma 3:  Under the M-form, parallel experimentation always yields higher expected benefits and lower 
expected costs than immediate full change: 
 πm11 > πm2 and cm11 < cm2. 
 
 If two independent blueprints are available, then it is always better to try one in each unit rather 
than one in both units.  Why do two independent experiments always give higher expected benefits than 
two perfectly correlated experiments?  In the first period, the two will give the same expected outcome 
but since two independent experiments have a higher probability of at least one success, success will tend 
to be implemented earlier with independent experiments.  Similarly, the reason for the lower costs with 
two independent experiments is  that under the latter, the probability that no further cost will be paid next 
period is 1-(1-p)2 whereas it is only 1-p under two perfectly correlated experiments. 
 
Lemma 4:  Under the M-form: (1) parallel experimentation has both higher expected benefits and 
expected costs than experimentation in one unit: 
 πm11 > πm1 and cm11 > cm1. 
(2) parallel experimentation has higher net expected benefits than experimentation in one unit if and only 
if 
 C < C1 = pA(1+δ(1-p)2)/2[1-δ+δp(1-p)(1-δ(1-p))]+(1-δ(1-p)2). 
 
 The higher benefit of parallel experimentation compared to experimentation in one unit is due to 
two reasons.  First, it has a higher first period expected benefit (pR > pR/2 + 1/2 because pR > 1 (by 
Assumption 1).  Second, the former has a higher probability (i.e., 1-(1-p)2) than the latter (i.e., 1-p) to 
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have a known good blueprint from the second period onward. 
 The reason why parallel experimentation has higher costs than experimentation in one unit is that 
under the former at least 2C always has to be paid out up front.  Note that both cm11 and cm1 decline with 
p. The former declines faster than the latter as under M11 learning about a success is faster. Nevertheless, 
when p approaches 1, cm11 approaches 2C while cm1 approaches C(1+δ), which still remains smaller. 
 Looking at the difference (M11 - M1), we have: 
 d(M11 - M1)/dp = R(1+δ(1-p)2)-2pRδ(1-p)-2C[δ(1-2p)(1-δ(1-p))+δ2p(1-p)]-2δ(1-p) 
 = R(1+δ(1-p)(1-3p))-2Cδ[1-2p-δ(1-p)(1-3p)]-2δ(1-p) 
 = δ(1-p)(1-3p)(R+2Cδ)+R-2Cδ(1-2p)-2δ(1-p). 
There is thus a non-linear relationship between p and (M11 - M1).  Comparing the net benefits in M11 and 
M1 is therefore complicated.  But one sees intuitively that the lower C is relative to A, the higher the 
advantage of M11 over M1, and vice versa.  
 We can now summarize the comparison between various organizational forms: 
 
Proposition 5:  (1) the U-form has higher expected net benefits than all other organizational forms if λ = 1 
and either p = 1 or C > C2 = pRδ(1-p)2/[1-δ(1-p)2(1+2δp)]. 
(2) experimentation in one unit under the M-form dominates if λ is low enough and C > C1. 
(3) parallel experimentation under the M-form dominates if either λ = 1 but C < C1 or if λ is low enough, 
p > p  or C < C1. 
 
 The U-form dominates when communication quality is high and either setup costs are high or 
there is no uncertainty about the experiment.  The M-form with experimentation in one unit dominates 
when communication quality is low and setup costs are high; it dominates with parallel experimentation 
either when costs are low enough (in which case it dominates the U-form) or when communication 
quality is low enough but setup costs are sufficiently low and the probability of success sufficiently high 
(in which case it dominates partial experimentation).  A major difference between Propositions 4 and 5 is 
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as follows.  When parallel experimentation is not available, the flexibility advantage of the M-form can be 
achieved when setup costs are high and the probability of success is low, whereas when parallel 
experimentation is available an additional flexibility advantage of the M-form can be achieved when 
setup costs are low and the probability of success is high. 
 
V.  Coordination on Attribute Compatibility 
 In this section we extend our coordination concept to incorporate attribute compatibility between 
tasks iA and iB (i = 1, 2).  We will focus on the trade-off between better matching under the M-form and 
better compatibility under the U-form.  Therefore, we abstract from setup costs and assume C = 0 to make 
this trade-off clear.  We assume that the dimension of attributes for which compatibility between tasks iA 
and iB is required is of order k.  We assume that k ≤ 1, which represents the idea that the attributes to be 
made compatible typically have a lower dimension than the attributes to be matched.  Indeed, remember 
that compatibility concerns attributes of similar tasks which in general are not matched together but rather 
act as substitutes for one another.  Whereas matching is the rule for complementary parts, substitution is 
not necessarily the rule for similar parts. 
 Under the U-form, unit officers coordinate compatibility between tasks iA and iB within each 
unit.  Because they do not need to communicate with other officers, compatibility will be achieved 
perfectly inside each unit of the U-form.  Under the M-form, unit officers must send messages about 
shocks concerning attribute compatibility to the top officer who is responsible for attribute compatibility. 
 The probability of a message being correctly received by the top officer is λk. 
 In the example of innovation in truck manufacturing, bearings for the model A truck should be 
compatible with bearings for the model B truck, and similarly for the transmission systems for the two 
models.  Otherwise, even if the two trucks run well, the lack of service (or higher costs of inventories) due 
to the incompatibility of the two models will lower the value of the new truck.  In the example of 
enterprise restructuring and the social safety net, if the layoff policies in the two regions are not 
compatible, inefficient close-downs may occur.  Similarly, if the rules of eligibility for compensations in 
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the social safety net are not compatible across regions, sub-optimal labor mobility may result.   
 We assume the following payoff structure when compatibility is required in addition to attribute 
matching.  Again, let the status quo payoff be 1/2.  Consider the payoffs for region A under reform 
(payoffs for B are defined symmetrically).  Suppose the blueprint is good, then (i) with change in task 1A 
but not in task 2A (or change in task 2A but not in task 1A), the payoff is (R+1)/4 if the attributes 
between 1A and 2A are matched, and the attributes between 1A and 1B and those between 2A and 2B are 
compatible, otherwise 0; and (ii) with reform in both tasks 1A and 2A, the payoff is R/2 if the attributes 
between 1A and 2A are matched, and the attributes between 1A and 1B and those between 2A and 2B are 
compatible, otherwise 0.  If the program is bad, then the payoff is always 0.12
 Under the U-form, because coordination on compatibility is perfect, the expected payoff is the 
same as in the case without attribute compatibility analyzed in section III.  But, the expected payoffs of 
the M-form will be different.  Local officers will continue to make perfect attribute matching in both 
units.  In the M-form without experimentation, the top officer now receives four messages from the two 
local officers about compatibility shocks.  Therefore, we can write down the expected payoff under M-
form as 
 πm2 = p{λ4kR/(1-δ) + δ(1-λ4k)πm2} + (1-p)δπm2, 
from which we obtain: 
 πm2 = pRλ4k/{(1-δ)[1-δ[p(1-λ4k)+(1-p)]]}. 
 Now consider the experimentation approach in the M-form.  Suppose a blueprint is tried in unit 
A, and unit B remains unchanged.  With probability 1-p, the program is bad.  Therefore, the payoff in A 
is 0.  However, with probability λ4k, compatibility is achieved and the unreformed unit B produces payoff 
1/2.  With probability 1-λ4k, the payoff in B is 0 due to compatibility failure.  In period 2, we are back to 
 
    12 The assumption here that the payoff is zero when attributes between tasks iA and iB are not compatible is made for 
simplicity.  It makes the disadvantage of the M-form in coordinating compatibility the highest.  In addition, the 
assumption that compatibility is not achieved if any one message is wrong also simplifies the analysis.  Relaxing either 
of these assumptions will not change our results qualitatively. 
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the situation of period 1.  With probability p, the program is good.  In this case, with probability λ4k, 
compatibility is achieved, and the total payoff is (R+1)/2.  In the next period, the same reform program is 
used in B.  However, the officers in the two regions still need to communicate with the top officer for the 
purpose of coordination on compatibility between tasks iA and iB.  Thus, there is a probability of 1-λ4k 
that the coordination on compatibility will fail: in such a case, the payoff will be 0 and we will be back to 
the situation of period 1.  Therefore, we have, 
 πm1 = p{λ4k[(R+1)/2 + δπk] + (1-λ4k)δπm1} + (1-p)[λ4k/2 + δπm1], 
where πk is the expected payoff from two regions when four messages need to be reported to the top 
officer for coordination on compatibility: 
 πk = λ4kR/(1-δ) + (1-λ4k)δπk, 
which gives: 
 πk = λ4kR/{(1-δ)[1-(1-λ4k)δ]}. 
Therefore, we obtain: 
 πm1 = {pλ4k[(R+1)/2+δπk]+(1-p)λ4k/2}/{1-δ[p(1-λ4k)+1-p]}. 
 Because of Assumption 1, pR > 1, then we have: 
 
Lemma 5:  Under the M-form experimentation in one unit is always dominated by immediate full change: 
πm2 > πm1. 
 
 Without the setup costs, there is no benefit from waiting as long as a blueprint is attractive (in 
expected terms) on a per-period basis.  In this case, experimentation cannot be a good strategy. 
 
Proposition 6:  Comparing immediate full change under the M-form and the U-form: 
(1) πm2 = πu2 for λ = 1.  For λ < 1, there exists k*(λ, p) > 0 such that πm2 > πu2 if and only if k < k*(λ, p).  
In particular, for p = 1, k*(λ, 1) = 1/2. 
(2) There exists k*(λ), where 0 < k*(λ) < 1/2, such that: 
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(i) for k < k*(λ), πm2 > πu2 for all p; 
(ii) for k*(λ) < k < 1/2, there exists p such that πm2 > πu2 for p > p and πm2 < πu2 otherwise; and 
(iii) for k > 1/2, πm2 < πu2 for all p. 
 
 The first part of Proposition 6 says that the tradeoff between the M-form and the U-form is that 
between the ability of coordination on attribute matching and that on compatibility.  When coordinating 
compatibility is less demanding (i.e., k < k*), then the M-form has an advantage over the U-form.  On the 
other hand, if coordinating compatibility is very demanding (i.e., k > k*), coordination becomes less of a 
problem in the U-form than in the M-form; consequently, the U-form will dominate the M-form. 
 The second part of Proposition 6 says more.  When attribute compatibility is not important 
compared to attribute matching, then the M-form is better than the U-form.  When attribute compatibility 
is moderately important, then the M-form is better than the U-form if uncertainty of the blueprint is low, 
but the U-form is better if the uncertainty is high.  The reason is that πm2 increases faster than πu2 when p 
increases for moderate values of k.  When attribute compatibility is very important, than the U-form is 
always better. 
 
VI. Reforms in Transition Economies 
 Our first example on how organizational forms of governments affect reforms is agricultural 
reforms in China and former Soviet Union. The China reforms started in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
within the M-form planning system. The success of agriculture reform is closely related to the roles of 
regional governments in solving coordination problems in the reform.  Associated with the deepening of 
the reform, planning is gradually abandoned. However, the inherited M-form structure of the government 
organization still play important roles in further reforms. In contrast, the Soviet Union started their 
agriculture reform in the 1980s within the U-form planning system, which failed to coordinate reform 
related activities. This contributes to the ill fate of the agriculture reform.  Moreover, problems inherited 
from U-form structure continuous to hamper transition after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
 Agriculture reforms in both countries are centred at replacing collective farming by household 
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farming. There are many “blueprints” of household farming. Control rights of land may be partly 
delegated to households for a short time period; or may be leased to households for a longer period of 
time. Alternatively, ownership of land may be transferred to households altogether. These reforms face 
blueprint uncertainty and implementation (attribute matching) problems.  First, it is not clear ex ante how 
households would respond to incentives under different reform blueprints; 13 Or how differfent blueprints 
would interatct with coordination problems.   
Second, coordination problem arises in introducing household farming.  Household farming 
allows households to choose new crops/ products for profits, say to change from grain to vegetables, 
fruits, aquatic products, diary products, etc.  Producing and harvesting new products will involve 
interactions with other sectors. For example, when farmers change production from grain to fishery, 
compared with grain production, aquatic production/harvesting may interfere with water traffic and 
irrigations; moreover, transport and storage of aquatic products have substantial different requirements 
than those of grain. Only when related attribute matching problems are solved an agriculture reform can 
succeed. 
Under the M-form planning structure, China regional governments, such as county governments 
have the responsibility of coordinating activities in agricultural production, transport, storage, and 
processing etc. It is in this institutional context, the agricultural household responsibility system was 
introduced/experimented through initiatives of some regional governments.  Together with redistribution 
of control rights of lands, regional governments’ coordination over economic activities across sectors and 
across households has played critical roles for reform to be successful.    
Before the reform, the Chinese agriculture was over-concentrated on grain production. A major 
feature of the successful Chinese agricultural reform is the change of production (made by household 
farms with the coordination help of regional governments), from grain to other crops/products, such as 
aquatic products, animal husbandry, and fruits etc. Taking fishery sector as an example, at the national 
level the total output of aquatic products increased from 4.6 million tons in 1978 to 41.2 million tons in 
1999; while total output of grain increased from 304.8 million tons in 1978 to 508.4 million tons in 1999. 
As a result the share of output value of fishery in agriculture gross output value increased from 1.4% in 
 
13 Households may doubt that the reform will continue.  Such worries have good reasons; indeed a policy 
reversal did happen in the late 1960s in China and those hard working farmers who became richer 
suffered politically and economically. 
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1978 to 10.3% in 1999.14    
When farmers choose to shift from grain production to fish farming, the physical and 
informational infrastructure requirements must be adapted.  These involve substantial amount of 
coordination across sectors/industries, which household farms usually cannot do by themselves. Attribute 
matching problems may occur in the following dimensions: 
    (1) Conditions required for raising fish or fishing may be in conflict with requirements for water 
transport and irrigation of grain fields in terms of quality, quantity, location and timing of using water; 
    (2) Fish species may be region specific; moreover, selections of fish species and grain species are 
different in different areas; 
    (3) Transport and storage means required for harvesting fish differ from those for harvesting grain; and 
    (4) Disease control is different for fish and plants. 
In the following, we use Xinhui county in Guangdong Province to illustrate how regional 
governments under a M-form structure solve these problems in the reform. All the material about this 
county are from Xinhui Xianzhi Editorial Committee (1995, 1997). Xinhui County government is 
responsible to coordinate economic activities in agriculture, industry, transportation, commerce, and 
R&D, etc. within the county. Concerning agriculture, under the county government, there are 21 
townships (or communes before 1984), which in turn coordinate 2800 villages (or production teams 
before 1984). Xinhui aquatic production increased very rapidly since the reform that the total aquatic 
output in 1985 increased by 230% than 1978.   
An important government agent in the aquatic sector in Xinhui is the County Aquatic Bureau, which 
has subordinate apparatus organizations to coordinate county-wide fresh water and ocean aquatic 
production, transport, processing, and supplies: a Fingerling, Fry and Fish Feed Company; a Fishing 
Admin Station; a Fishing Harbour Monitoring Station; an Aquatic New Technology Promotion Station; 
the Xinhui County Fishing Radio Station (is a specialized radio station for fishing production, transport, 
research and safety); the County Aquatic Supply and Marketing Company; and the County Aquatic 
Import and Export Company. In addition to this bureau, the county government also coordinates many 
agents responsible for other industries when the development of aquatic sector interact (or interfere) with 
other sectors, such as use of water; disease control; and infrastructure (fish boat harbours, radio, etc).  
Under the M-form structure, Xinhui County government has has successfully made attribute matching 
 
14 Chinese statistics defines agriculture as consisted of farming, forestry, animal husbandry and fishery. 
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in the growing fishery sector during the reform, which ensured a smooth transition to household farming 
along all four dimensions listed above: 
    First, a key factor in the growth of aquatic industry is the increase of the aquatic production area. Total 
aquatic production area can be increased by using rivers, ponds, and reservoirs. The coordination role of 
local government is important here. Attributes to be matched in order to increase the aquatic production 
area include timing, origination/destination/route, quality/quantity of water transmission to match 
demands in aquatic production, irrigation and transport. If too much water is diverted from a river into 
fishing ponds at a wrong time, the water level of the river may decrease too much, making transport 
difficult or leaving too little water for irrigation of rice fields. Water sharing for the purpose of irrigation 
and aquatic ponds has been coordinated by the county government. Part of the coordination is done by 
building new reservoirs to ensure regular water supply. It would be much more difficult to coordinate 
transport, irrigation, and aquatic activities if these were controlled by different specialized ministries 
separately. 
    Second, the selection of species best suitable for the county is also important.  Some species fit better 
than others to a particular region's weather, water quality, water plants, plankton etc. The county 
government's Aquatic Bureau took the initiative in coordinating technological changes in aquatic 
production, such as helping select aquatic species best suitable for the county and giving technical support 
to aquatic farmers. For example, in 1979 the Aquatic Bureau helped to coordinate an enlargement of 
production of fingerling and fry.  By 1985, the area of fish ponds for growing fingerling and fry increased 
by 65.8% compared with 1976; and the output of fingerling and fry increased by 130% over the same 
time period. 
    Third, the supply of fish feed and cold storage for harvested fish are other important factors that affect 
aquatic production. There are important attribute matching problems involved in fish feed supply (and 
similarly in cold storage services). When a new species of fish is introduced or whenever there is 
substantial change in weather conditions, requirements for fish feed (or for storage) must be adjusted 
accordingly, which in turn requires adjustments in raw materials used by fish feed plants. When markets 
were not yet well developed to take care of these problems, the county government played again an 
important coordination role.  In 1979 the county government built a cold storage plant -- the Xinhui 
County Yamen Cold Storage Plant, which has provided ice, cold storage and processing (e.g. quick 
frozen) for aquatic industry in the county. In 1983 and 1984, jointly with some township governments the 
county government built two fish feed plants (Tangxia Fish Feed Plant and Hetang State-Township Joint 
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Fish Feed Plant). 
    Fourth, disease control, in particular prevention of contagious fish diseases, is another critical factor 
and often requires an emergency response. Diseases may indeed spread via different waterways at a 
considerable speed. Disease control requires coordination between aquatic production, supply of 
drugs/disinfectants, transport, and irrigation, R&D for the region and solutions specific to the local fish 
species. Controlling aquatic diseases is an emergency matter, requiring quick actions to specify 
drugs/disinfectants and the corresponding methods of using them, so time is of overriding importance.  
This is similar to dispatching an ambulance to meet particular requests in a medical emergency (Milgrom 
and Roberts, 1992).  In this situation, markets may not be able to coordinate in time.  The capacity of 
county government in coordinating all affected sectors is then critical for implementing disease control 
measures. In Xinhui, the Disease Prevention and Vaccination Department under the County Aquatic 
Bureau has played such a coordination role, taking into account various ecological problems.  The 
Department provided fish immunization services and other medicines for fishes, for example, in 1985 it 
provided vaccination for 4.3 million Buffalo fish which increased substantially the survival rate of these 
fish. 
As a result of the coordination role of local government, Xinhui aquatic production increased rapidly 
since the reform. Total aquatic production in Xinhui in 1985 increased by 2.3 times over that of 1978. 
The success of Chinese local governments like Xinhui illustrates the strong capacity of the M-form 
structure in coordinating attribute matching.  The local government has a good knowledge of local 
conditions and can respond efficiently given its authority in making attribute matching at the local level. 
In a sharp contrast to the Chinese experience, in the Soviet Union, it appears that regional 
governments were not able to solve coordination problems arisen in their agricultural reforms.  
Associated with inherited problems of coordination in the transition total agricultural production in Russia 
declined by 29% between 1990 and 1994 (Laird, 1997). Under the Soviet system, farming was 
subordinated to many different ministries. In the eighties, tasks related to agro-food industry are divided 
by 11 or even more ministries: The Ministry of Agriculture, Trade, Cereal and Grain Production, Fruit 
and Vegetable Farming, Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Feed Production, Tractors and 
Farm Machinery, Land Reclamation and Water Resources, Meat and Dairy Industry, Food Industry, Rural 
Construction and Fertilizer Production (Wegren, 1998, p. 62). Regional authorities had no control over 
farming and played only a role of “expediters, throwing themselves in the search for batteries, belts and 
harvester blades, undoing complex knots in the supply system”  (van Atta, 1993b). Tractors were 
  
 
 34 
                                                
provided centrally by the so-called MTS stations. The tasks of providing inputs to the farmers, of 
managing their operations, storage, processing, transport, road infrastructure were all allocated to separate 
agencies over which collective farms had no control. Warehouses and processing plants were more likely 
to be located hundreds of kms away from farms (van Atta, 1993a). Under this structure it is very hard to 
solve coordination problems. For example, within that structure, any change in grain production involves 
5 ministries: Ministry of Agriculture, Trade, Cereal and Grain Production, Tractors and Farm Machinery, 
Food Industry, Rural Construction and Fertilizer. Any farm (private or collective) changes crops from 
grain to vegetable production, the farm has to deal with these ministries plus some other 2 ministries: 
Land Reclamation and Water Resources, Fruit and Vegetable Farming. 
Before any reform measure was introduced, serious coordination problems created by this structure 
led to substantial waste at storage, transport and processing stages. Coordination failure was so important 
that at the end of the eighties, there was a consensus among experts of Soviet agriculture that the biggest 
problem in that sector was the at the distribution stage (Wädekin, 1992). In Russia, about a quarter of total 
grain products (average of 49 million tons of grain in 1986-1990) was wasted due to bad conditions of 
storage, rotting of bread. 30-40% of potatoes were lost to rot in storage places. Of the 40% loss in potatoes 
and vegetables, 1/3 was lost in bad transport and storage, 20% due to bad coordination (not enough transport 
capacity, not enough gas or oil, spare parts).  
In the Soviet period, some reform attempts were introduced to change organizational forms 
partially to mitigate those problems in agriculture.  In the 1980’s, organizations called RAPO (raïonnoe 
agropromyshlennoe obyedinenie) were created to locally coordinate activities between the various 
ministries. However, this led to a conflict of authority between the functional ministries and the new 
regional coordination structure. The RAPO’s did not have the power over resources controlled by the 
ministries15 and they were generally ignored by the latter.  Other attempts at reforms such as the 
introduction of an overarching ministry Gosagroprom, the introduction of agrofirms at a smaller scale and 
even the introduction of leasing contracts (arenda) failed similarly because of lack of control over the 
overall farming process (Butterfield, 1990).   
In March 1989, the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party decided under Gorbachev’s 
impulsion to launch a reform in agriculture whereby peasants could lease land with long term contracts up to 
50 years. This may seem similar to the Chinese reform in the early 1980’s but it left coordination problems 
 
15 Due to the U-form structure, production infrastructures remained geographically dispersed which 
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to the farmers. Although leasing gave incentives to the peasants, farmers were dependent on the 
infrastructure and machinery, on the feed, fodder, seed, provided by agents under different ministries and 
technical support and mechanized assistance of the collective farm. Input supplies were not guaranteed.  
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, although central planning was abandoned and 
privatisation was a policy problems inherited from the U-form structure continuous to cause great troubles 
for reforms aimed to establish household farms. One important heritage of the U-form structure is the lack 
of knowledge on coordinating household farming and the lack of facilities to support household farming.  
Under the U-form structure, the regional governments have no knowledge on how to help household 
farming even when they are willing to support private farming in principle.  
Dairying industry is a good example. Dairying involves a complex and interdependent processes 
from forage productions to retailing. However, under the U-form planning structure, “those responsible 
for forage production have different reporting channels from those who are responsible for breeding. 
Those responsible for herd health - one element which contributes to the sanitary quality of milk - report 
to different people than those responsible for the maintenance of milking equipment - another element 
which contributes to sanitary quality. Furthermore, those responsible for individual segments of the dairy 
operation are each provided with separate production goals which are not compatible with obtaining the 
best results from the entire system. [...] As milk processing is someone else's responsibility, factors 
affecting milk quality become irrelevant for those involved in managing the dairy cows. There is little 
communication among those directly responsible for the various activities which make up dairying. 
Individual production workers receive top-down direction from those in charge of their segmented 
dairying activity.”    As a result, “given the compartmentalization of responsibilities” in the U-form 
structured planning system, there are no individuals who have a comprehensive and holistic 
understanding of dairying as a system. In addition to the lack of knowledge, it is also reported that “the 
large-scale, centralized animal facilities previously invested in will be impossible to divide and sharing 
arrangements will be complex and difficult to organize.” (source….) 
In general, serious coordination problems inherited from the Soviet system appeared to be a 
major factor which hampers Russia’s privatisation in farming. Wehrheim et al. (2000) argue that 
underdeveloped institutions and infrastructure, such as a lack of a system of market information (where to 
buy and sell and at what price), are the main problem plaguing Russian agriculture. There is even 
 
made regional coordination more difficult. 
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evidence that the post-harvest waste has been increasing in the nineties. (Laird, 1997). Indeed, in many 
regions, the cost of shipping agricultural goods exceeds the producer prices (Liefert-Swinnen, 2002).  
Without proper solutions to the coordination problems, Russian private farmers have to work under very 
primitive conditions which discourage collective farm employees to become private farmers. S. Wegren, 
cites an article about how coordination problems hamper privatization in agriculture in Moscow oblast: 
once becoming private farmers “they immediately encountered massive problems – no machinery, 
nowhere to obtain gas, nowhere to sell produce, and so on. People saw this and did not want to follow 
their example.”   A survey by the World Bank in 1994 showed that 92% of collectively-owned or state-
owned farm employees did not want to become private farmers. The main reasons invoked were 
difficulties with purchase of farm inputs (60% of respondents) and insufficient capital (74%) (Brooks et 
al. 1994). A 1994 world bank sponsored survey in agriculture found that in two thirds of state farms, only 
less than 10 people (3 families) left (Wegren, 1998, p. 83). Moreover, for similar reasons land leasing also 
remained very limited and did not enjoy popularity among peasants (Wegren, p. 68).  
    Our next example concerns reform programs for expanding foreign trade and attracting foreign 
investments in China and in the FSU since the 1980s. When these two countries started reforms in this 
area, both governments issued decrees or ad hoc laws to support foreign investment.  However, they both 
did not have constitutional protection of private property rights and they both did not have most of 
commercial codes.  Therefore, it is conceivable that it is difficult to convince a large number of foreign 
investors that their investments in those countries are safe. In our terminology, such programs are 
associated with low p.  Applying our model, the M-form would try small scale experiments whereas the 
U-form would either to experiment at full scale or choose not to experiment at all. Our predictions are 
consistent with what happened in China, where regional governments take substantial responsibilities to 
coordinate foreign trade and foreign investments within their regions, and FSU, where foreign trade and 
foreign investments are managed by specialized ministries (see Appendix). 
    In 1980, the Chinese government decided to try out different laws and governance in a few cities called 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs), which are coordinated by regional governments. The first group of 
small scall experiment for SEZ started in four cities in Guangdong province and Fujian province. In 1984, 
the experiment was expanded into another 14 cities in coastal provinces. As a result, till 1992 the SEZs 
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are expanded into all the capital cities of inland provinces and include other 100 national and regional 
economic and technological development zones. Essentially SEZs have spread out all over the nation and 
they have great positive impacts in attracting FDI to China. Closely associated with this development, 
China becomes one of the major exporters in the world and the largest FDI reciepient country in the 
world (since 2004). 
    By contrast, consistent with our model's prediction, the FSU government always introduced reforms in 
foreign trade/investment at full scales nationwide.  Concerning trade, in 1986 the Council of Ministers 
adopted the decree to change the structure of the foreign trade bureaucracy drasticly.  This reallocated 
power from one ministry specialized in foreign trade to twenty-one ministries and state committees 
specialized in different industries.  With respect to attracting foreign investments, in 1987, the Council of 
Ministers adopted a resolution -- a law on joint ventures. Implementation was carried out by specialized 
ministries. 
    The FSU foreign trade bureaucracy was created by the 1930 Decree Number 358. The council's State 
Foreign Economic Commission coordinated the activities of ministries and departments in foreign 
economic activities. They planned, regulated, monitored, and carried out all Soviet foreign economic 
activities. There are six central bodies under the Council of Ministries in foreign economic relations. The 
import and export of goods, services, and resources were managed by the State Planning Committee 
(Gosplan), the State Committee for Material and Technical Supply (Gossnab), and the State Committee 
for Science and Technology (GKNT). Gosplan formulated all import and export plans, coordinated the 
allocation of investment and other resources, and had final authority over all decisions concerning foreign 
trade, including trade levels and commodity composition. Gossnab coordinated the allocation of resources 
not handled by Gosplan and played a major role in selecting and allocating imports. GKNT negotiated 
technical cooperation agreements and monitored license and patent purchases and sales in order to 
introduce new technology into the Soviet economy. 
    The State Committee on Prices (Goskomtsen), the Ministry of Finance, and the State Bank (Gosbank) 
held jurisdiction over the financing of foreign trade. Goskomtsen established prices for all imports and 
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some exports. The Ministry of Finance controlled the balance of payments and monitored the impact of 
foreign trade on the state budget. Finally, Gosbank set the exchange rate for the ruble (for value of the 
ruble--see Glossary) and managed the system of exchange within the Soviet Union. Gosbank supervised 
the Foreign Economic Activity Bank. 
    Moreover, some industrial ministries had their own Foreign Trade Organizations (FTOs). As of early 
1987, for example, forty-eight FTOs were under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and 
nine under the GKES, whereas the Ministry of the Maritime Fleet, the Ministry of the Fishing Industry, 
and the Ministry of Trade, among others, had their own FTOs. 
    The lack of direct contact between Soviet enterprises and their foreign customers or suppliers delayed 
contract negotiations and the specification of technical details. The general director of the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade's All-Union Association for the Export and Import of Technical Equipment, Boris K. 
Pushkin reported that `after an enterprise submitted a request for a foreign item, two to three years were 
required before it was included in the import plan and funds were allocated for its purchase. In the 
interim, the needs of the enterprise had often changed.' 
    In 1986 the Council of Ministers adopted the decree to change the structure of the foreign trade 
bureaucracy drasticly.  Until 1987 the forty-eight FTOs subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Trade 
administered more than 90 percent of Soviet foreign trade turnover. In 1987 the ministry lost control of 
20 percent of Soviet foreign trade turnover. The government granted direct foreign trade rights to twenty-
one ministries and state committees, sixty-seven industrial enterprises, and eight interbranch scientific 
production complexes. Exporting enterprises gained the right to retain part of their hard-currency 
earnings. Each ministry or enterprise was to pay for its investment imports with its own hard currency, 
and the heads of ministries and enterprises became personally responsible for the efficient use of hard-
currency funds. These measures gave enterprises more influence in import decision making. 
    In 1987, the Council of Ministers adopted a resolution – a law on joint ventures. This legislation 
opened up enterprises inside the Soviet Union for the first time since the Bolshevik Revolution to foreign 
participation. But implementation was carried out by specialized ministries. Numerous obstacles arose in 
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implementing the joint venture law. Complaints by Western partners dealt with uncertainties concerning 
Soviet trade regulations, problems with the supply of goods, difficulties finding qualified Soviet 
managers, problems in projecting production costs, and complications finding office space in Moscow. 
By August 1988, about 50 joint ventures were registered in the Soviet Union, and approximately 300 
were under negotiation. 
 
 Similarly to agriculture, the differences in organizational form can explain differences in 
industrial reforms in China vs the Soviet Union as well as differences in privatization policies under 
transition.  We lack the space to elaborate here on those examples. 
 
VII. Other Applications 
 In this section we apply our theory to other two areas: business firms and the organization of 
government. 
 
A.  Business Firms 
 We first revisit the three famous cases documented by Chandler (1962, 1977), all of them 
showing coordination failures between production and sales under a U-form when a corresponding firm 
introduced new products or adopted innovations.  These coordination failures were a major impetus for 
the subsequent change of organizational form in these corporations from a U-form to an M-form.  While 
the emerging M-form had many different varieties such as organization by geography, product, process, 
etc, they shared a common feature that units became self contained.  Our theory can interpret the 
coordination failures under the U-form in a consistent way. 
 The first case is about du Pont.  Before 1921, du Pont was organized as a U-form: under the 
headquarters there were functional units for production and sales respectively.  After World War I du 
Pont expanded production from explosives to consumer products, such as paints (Chandler, 1962, pp. 78-
94).  At that time, whenever a new chemical was developed which changed the attributes of explosives 
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and paints, the production unit reported the attribute change to headquarters, which then sent commands 
to the sales unit.  Then the sales unit learned the attributes of the new product and demonstrated them to 
customers.  At the same time, the sales unit learned customers' preferences and translated them into a new 
set of attributes. 
 The expansion of product lines caused major coordination troubles in du Pont: there were too 
many mistakes and inertia in adjusting attributes.  Du Pont started to have losses.  The problem became 
most evident in 1919 when almost all the new final products, which required a great deal of coordination, 
had (sometimes heavy) losses.  In contrast, in the same year nearly all the traditional du Pont products 
which did not require much coordination made profits (Chandler, 1962, p. 95).  Moreover, while du Pont 
suffered heavy losses for some new products such as paints, most of its competitors who were specialized 
in paints did not have similar coordination problems and "were enjoying one of their most profitable 
years" (Chandler, 1962, p. 92).  In the early 1920, a subcommittee under the Executive Committee at du 
Pont investigated and concluded that "the underlying problem was not one of selling, but organization."  
The subcommittee proposed to change du Pont into a multi-divisional organization.  This conclusion was 
further confirmed when du Pont suffered even bigger losses in 1921 after every effort was made to 
improve informational channels while keeping the U-form under the President Irénée du Pont (Chandler, 
1962, pp. 96-101).  Later in 1921, failure to improve the organization's performance and the persistent 
losses convinced du Pont to reorganize the firm into an M-form.  This solved the problem, and the 
organizational form has been kept stable since then (Chandler, 1996, pp. 104-113). 
 The second case is about Sears Roebuck & Co.  Before 1925, Sears, the largest mail-order firm in 
the U.S., was organized as a U-form.  At the headquarters in Chicago, there were departments responsible 
for specialized functions nationwide, such as the Merchandise Department responsible for procurement, 
the Catalogue and Advertisement Departments responsible for sales, and the Operating Department 
responsible for distributing commodities from producers to customers (Chandler, 1962, pp. 226-232).  
The U-form structure worked well when the number of regions covered and the number of stores was not 
too large. 
  
 
 41 
 When Sears expanded into many new territories, acquired a large number of new stores and 
factories, and involved in new businesses such as retailing, its coordination problems became severe.  
Many idiosyncratic regional issues were hard to manage through separate functional departments.  To 
manage the vast multi-regional mail-order/retail network while keeping the U-form structure, Sears put 
territorial officers in charge of handling territorial-specific issues by giving them authority on their 
region's personnel issues (Chandler, 1962, pp. 253-256).  However, without the authority to coordinate 
problems locally, this structure did not work.  In fact, on many occasions, instead of reporting to 
functional departments, local shops often relied on territorial officers to solve their problems (Chandler, 
1962, p. 259).  In 1939 Sears started a reorganization based on a territorial principle and completed in 
1948: under the headquarters there were multi-functional and autonomous territorial divisions, such as the 
Midwestern Zone, the North-Western Zone, the North Central Zone, etc (Chandler, pp. 268-282). 
 A similar story holds for the Ford Motors Company.  Before World War II, with a U-form 
organization and a focus on the Model-T car, Ford was the largest car producer in the U.S. and its 
engineers were among the most innovative.  Ford also developed inexpensive tractors and technically 
excellent airplanes.  However, the separated production and sales structures led to a poor coordination 
between production and sales.  Eventually, Ford failed in producing and selling tractors and air planes 
although technically it made them well (Chandler, 1962, p. 301, pp. 372-373). 
 Argyres (1995) tells the story of how IBM via its M-form corporation created organizational 
flexibility allowing its PC division to introduce  "cc:Mail" (a communication software) and "Notes" (a 
multi-task software from Lotus Development Corporation) to face the tough competition in its market and 
could later achieve compliance with a very large-scale software called "the Systems Application 
Architecture" (SAA) aiming toward allowing different hardware and operating systems to exchange data. 
B.  The Organization of Government and the Foundations of Federalism 
 Two organizational forms of government have received much attention: the unitary state and the 
federal state.  Our analysis starts to provide a theoretical foundation of both, especially federalism. France 
and Japan, among others, have a unitary state, and their governments are mainly organized along 
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functional lines where specialized ministries concentrate most powers, leaving regional governments with 
relatively little authority16.  The organizational form of the US government is a primary example of 
federalism.  The fifty states have the constitutional rights and responsibilities for coordinating 
government activities inside their jurisdictions.  This spawns an environment to try innovative policies for 
themselves. 
 It has been perceived a long time ago that the American federal system may facilitate experimenting 
innovative policies. It was argued in 1888 that “federalism enables people to try experiments which could 
not safely be tried in a large centralized country.” (Bryce, 1901). A few decades later, the American Supreme 
Court Justice, Louis Brandeis, had a famous characterization of American federalism as the "laboratory of 
the states."  By laboratories, he meant that the states could experiment with new solutions to social and 
economic problems. Those that worked could be applied nationally; those that failed could be discarded. He 
said in 1932, “it is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may… 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel societal and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country." (Osborne, 1988). Indeed, many changes of legal rules and government policies in America were 
initiated by some states, usually from richer or liberal states, such as Massachusetts, California, and New 
York. And these experiments were later imitated by other states. 
 Policy experimentation has drawn attention in political science and sociology and there is a large 
literature that looks at the timing of policy imitation across states in the U.S. That literature takes state level 
policy experimentation/imitation as given and focuses on the time path of new policies, such as policies on 
education, welfare, or civil rights etc., from their first tries in one state to general imitation or adoption by a 
large number of states. And the records date back to the late 18th century.  A non-controversial feature 
characterized in this literature is that similar to a technological innovation imitation process, a typical 
innovative policy adoption/diffusion process across states displays a S-shaped curve (for a survey, see Gray, 
 
    16  It is interesting to note that France introduced some decentralization of power in 1981. 
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1994; and Oates, 1999).17  
 Instead of focusing on diffusion, in this paper, we look at how federalism provides a flexible 
mechanism for state governments to coordinate policy experimentation; and for the federal government to 
take advantages of or to propagate successful experimentation results.  In the following, we provide some 
examples that demonstrate how state experiments worked.  
 Our first example involves the origin of the New Deal policies – state policy experimentation. 
Facing the challenges and risks associated with the rapid industrialization of the American economy early 
this century, a few states initiated innovative policies within their jurisdictions, such as unemployment 
compensation schemes, massive public programs, and schemes related to deposit insurance and social 
security. Most of those programs were complementary to each other and state government coordination 
was critical to the implementation. Later, many of the successful ones were institutionalized at the federal 
level that speeded up the adoption of the policies. In fact, a large number of Roosevelt’s New Deal 
policies were inspired or precisely copied from those successful state level experiments. Roosevelt 
acknowledged that, “practically all the things we’ve done [about the New Deal] in the federal government 
are like things Al Smith did as governor of New York." (Osborne, 1988). 
 Our next example involves state coordinated policy experiments to deal with challenges 
associated with the replacement of the traditional industries by high tech business in the last two decades. 
Since the late 1970s there has been a trend in the U.S. on adopting new policies, such as reform of public 
education systems; creating public venture capital funds; setting up programs to match local academia and 
business to advance technological innovation etc. This trend began with ‘experiments’ in Massachusetts 
and California. With the help of the federal government’s agents, successful policies were learned by the 
 
17 This literature has documented various innovation adoption paths of a large number of policy experiments across 
states. For example, the state-boards-of-education system was first tried in one state in 1784, and was adopted by 40 
states in 1949; while the degree-requirement-for-elementary-school-teaching policy was first started in one state in 
1930 and was adopted by 46 states in 1969 (Gray, 1973). 
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Midwest. Then those spread out to the rest of the nation. For instance, heavily subsidized community 
college was rare before the mid-1970s. However, following the success models of Massachusetts and 
California it has become a standard public education institution in most states.  
 
VII.  Concluding Remarks 
 Our theory on coordinating reforms in transition economies opens new perspectives on 
understanding how the differences in organizational forms in the EEFSU and China affected 
their transition paths.  For the first time, we formally address the following questions:  Why is 
China special in its use of experimental approaches?  Why is the U-form not suitable for doing 
local experiments?  The importance of understanding these questions lies in the fact that in the 
EEFSU, some experimental reforms that were introduced before their transition failed.  On this 
basis, the regional experimental approach to reforming a planned economy has been discredited 
and abandoned during later transitions in these economies. 
 The difference between the M-form and the U-form is highly relevant in other aspects in 
centralized economies.  Note that the consequences of a collapse of power at the center are much 
smaller in the M-form.  For example, during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), the Chinese 
central government almost completely lost its ability to coordinate the economy, but the national 
economy did not collapse:  National income dropped in two years (-7.2% in 1967 and -6.5% in 
1968) and recovered quickly afterwards without much central government coordination.   
 In the context of transition and price liberalization where government coordination is 
replaced by market forces, the output response is likely to be different in both organizational 
forms.  In a U-form economy with greater induced specialization and more widespread 
monopolies, price liberalization gives smaller outside options to firms in the domestic economy 
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in terms of finding new suppliers and/or clients while making disruptions of existing output links 
more dramatic, which is much in line with the output fall models of Blanchard and Kremer 
(1997) and Roland and Verdier (1999).  Blanchard and Kremer (1997) have emphasized the role 
of complexity in technological complementarities between firms in generating disruption.  In our 
framework, complexity is not simply an exogenous technological variable.  The choice of 
technology is affected by the organizational form.  Even for a given technology, the M-form 
reduces the complexity of coordination because of the decentralization of decision-making to 
self-contained units.  In contrast, by centralizing communication on attribute shocks, the U-form 
makes coordination more complex. 
 In the U-form economy, the higher degree of monopolization is likely to give single firms 
more holdup power over the government, possibly leading to more rent-seeking and soft budget 
constraints, whereas in the M-form economy competitive forces are likely to develop more 
easily from scratch, with single firms having less holdup power and less leverage via the 
government.  The larger firms left by the U-form economy are likely to require more 
sophisticated management expertise to operate in the global economy compared to their 
counterparts in the M-form organization.  A lack of fulfillment of requirements in terms of 
management expertise may lead to more disappointing results of privatization. 
 At a more general level, in this paper we introduced a method of modelling task 
coordination inside an organization as "attribute matching."  Using this method, we developed a 
theoretical analysis of organizational forms in order to understand the performance of the M-
form and U-form organizations in coordinating changes.  Our theory sheds new light on business 
organizations, transition economies, and the organization of government. 
 Our paper seems to be the first formal attempt to study how the M-form and U-form affect 
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coordination problems within an organization.  The paper mainly tries to provide a new 
conceptual framework while also deriving some predictions on the superiority of the M-form or 
the U-form, depending on the quality of communication within organizations, the uncertainty of 
innovations, and the costs of introducing innovations.  This paves the way for empirical analysis 
in the comparison of organizations in the future. 
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Appendix.  Mathematical Proofs 
 
Proof of Lemma 1:  (1) Because  
 πu2 = 2pπ[1 - (1-λ2)2δ]/{1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]}, 
where both π = λ2R/{2(1-δ)[1-(1-λ2)δ]} and [1-(1-λ2)2δ]/{1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]} increases in λ (the latter 
because [1-xδ]/{1-δ[px+(1-p)]} decreases in x), then πu2 increases in λ. 
(2) cu2 = C/{1-[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]δ} decreases in λ. 
cu2 < cm2 if and only if 
1 - δ(1-p) < 2[1-δ(p(1-λ2)2+1-p)] 
if and only if 
2δp(1-λ2)2 + δ(1-p) < 1, 
which is valid for all λ provided δ < 1/(1+p).? 
 
Proof of Proposition 1:  (1) By Lemma 1, at λ = 1, πu2 = πm2; but cu2 = C/(1-δ(1-p)) < cm2 = 2C/(1-δ(1-
p)), then U2 > M2.  Also by Lemma 1, πu2 increases in λ and cu2 decreases in λ, then U2 = πu2 - cu2 
increases in λ.  Because M2 is independent of λ and because U2 goes to 0 as λ decreases, then for p and C 
given there exists λ > 0 such that M2 > U2 if and only λ < λ. 
(2) For any λ < 1, M2 > U2 at C = 0.  When cu2 < cm2, cm2 also increases faster than cu2 as C increases, 
therefore, for p and λ given, such a C exists.  (U2 could be the same as M2 if both have the same value as 
the status quo at C.) 
 
Proof of Lemma 2:  (1) Note that pR(1+δ)/2+(1-δ)/2 is a weighted sum of pR and 1.  Therefore, because 
pR > 1 by Assumption 1, then the sum is less than pR, or πm1 < πm2. 
(2) Because dπm1/dp = [R(1+δ)/2 - δ/2]/[1-(1-p)δ]2 and dcm1/dp = -δ2C/[1-(1-p)δ]2, we have: 
 dM1/dp = [R(1+δ)/2 - δ/2 + δ2C]/[1-(1-p)δ]2 > 0. 
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Also because dπm2/dp = R/[1-(1-p)δ]2 and dcm2/dp = - 2Cδ/[1-(1-p)δ]2, then we have 
 dM2/dp = {R + 2Cδ}/[1-(1-p)δ]2 > 0. 
Therefore, by R(1+δ)/2 < R, δC - 1/2 < 2C, we have R(1+δ)/2 - δ/2 + δ2C < R + 2Cδ, then, dM2/dp > 
dM1/dp > 0.? 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:   
(1) Because  
M1 - M2 = {pR/2(1+δ) + (1-δ)/2 - pR - (1-δ)C(1+pδ) + 2C(1-δ)}/(1-δ)[1-δ(1-p)]  
= [C(1-pδ)-(pR-1)/2]/[1-δ(1-p)], 
then M1 > M2 if and only if p < p.  Furthermore, p < 1 if and only if R/2(1-δ) - C > 1/2(1-δ). 
From M1 = 1/(1-δ) we obtain: 
 pm1* = (2C+1)(1-δ)/{R(1+δ)-2δ(C(1-δ)+1)}, 
and from M2 = 1/(1-δ) we obtain: 
 pm2* = (2C+1)(1-δ)/(R-δ). 
Then pm1* < pm2* if and only if R/2(1-δ) - C > 1/2(1-δ). 
 By Lemma 2, pm1* < pm2* must imply that pm1* < pm2* < p. 
(2) follows directly from the expression for M1 - M2. ? 
 
Proof of Proposition 3:  We note that 
 πu2 = p{λ4[R/(1-δ)] + 2λ2(1-λ2)[R/2(1-δ) +δπ]}/{1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]} 
 = p{λ4[R + δR/(1-δ)] + 2λ2(1-λ2)[R/2 + δ[π + R/2(1-δ)]}/{1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+(1-p)]}. 
Comparing πu2 with πu1, because R > (R+1)/2 and R/2(1-δ) ≥ π, then πu2 > πu1.? 
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Proof of Proposition 4:  (1)  For λ = 1, πu2 = πm2 > πm1 and cu2 < cm1 < cm2.  Therefore, for λ large enough, 
by continuity, U2 > M2 and U2 > M1. 
(2) If λ is small enough, U2 will always be dominated by M1 or M2.  The rest of the proposition follows 
directly from Proposition 2.? 
 
Proof of Lemma 3:  πm11 > πm2 if and only if 
 {R(p2+p(1-p)(1+δ))}/(1-δ)[1-δ(1-p)2] > pR/{(1-δ)[1-(1-p)δ]}, 
if and only if 
 [1-δ(1-p)](p2+p(1-p)(1+δ)) > p(1-δ(1-p)2), 
if and only if 
 [1-δ(1-p)](1+δ(1-p)) > 1-δ(1-p)2, 
if and only if 
 1-δ2(1-p)2 > 1-δ(1-p)2, 
which is verified since δ < 1. 
 Similarly, cm11 < cm2 if and only if 
 2C[1+δp(1-p)]/[1-δ(1-p)2] < 2C/[1-(1-p)δ], 
if and only if 
 (1-δ(1-p))(1+δp(1-p)) < 1-δ(1-p)2
if and only if 
 δ2p(1-p)2 > 0, 
which is verified.? 
 
Proof of Lemma 4:  (1) πm11 > πm1 if and only if 
 {R(p2+p(1-p)(1+δ))}/(1-δ)[1-δ(1-p)2] > [pR(1+δ)+(1-δ)]/2(1-δ)[1-(1-p)δ], 
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if and only if 
 2{R(p2+p(1-p)(1+δ))}[1-(1-p)δ] > [pR(1+δ)+(1-δ)][1-δ(1-p)2], 
if and only if 
 [2pR][1-δ2(1-p)2] > [pR(1+δ)+(1-δ)][1-δ(1-p)2]. 
Because pR > 1 if and only if 2pR > pR(1+δ)+(1-δ), furthermore, 1-δ2(1-p)2 > 1-δ(1-p)2, then the above 
inequality holds. 
 Similarly, cm11 > cm1 if and only if 
 2C[1+δp(1-p)]/[1-δ(1-p)2] > C(1+pδ)/[1-(1-p)δ], 
if and only if 
 2 - 2δ(1-p)2 - 2δ2p(1-p)2 > 1 - δ(1-p)2 + pδ - δ2p(1-p)2, 
if and only if 
 1 > δ[p + (1-p)2 + δp(1-p)2], 
if and only  if 
 1 - δ > -δp(1-p)(1-δ(1-p)), 
which is always valid since 1 > δ(1-p). 
 (2) M11 > M1 if and only if 
 {R(p2+p(1-p)(1+δ))-2C(1-δ)(1+δp(1-p))}[1-δ(1-p)] 
 > {pR(1+δ)/2+(1-δ)/2-C(1-δ)(1+pδ)}[1-δ(1-p)2] 
if and only if 
 R(p2+p(1-p)(1+δ)-pR(1+δ)/2-(1-δ)/2+C(1-δ)(1+pδ)-2C(1-δ)(1+δp(1-p)) 
 > δ(1-p){R(p2+p(1-p)(1+δ))-2C(1-δ)(1+δp(1-p))-(1-p)[pR(1+δ)/2+(1-δ)/2-C(1-δ)(1+pδ)]} 
if and only if 
 (pR-1)(1-δ)/2+pRδ(1-p)-C(1-δ)[1-pδ(2p-1)] 
 > δ(1-p){pR[1+δ(1-p)+p]/2-(1-p)(1-δ)/2-C(1-δ)(1+p+δp(1-p))} 
if and only if 
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 (pR-1)(1-δ)/2+pRδ(1-p)-δ(1-p)[pR(1+δ(1-p)+p)/2-(1-p)(1-δ)/2] 
 > C(1-δ)[1-pδ(2p-1)]-δ(1-p)C(1-δ)(1+p+δp(1-p)) 
if and only if 
 (pR/2)[1-δ+2δ(1-p)-δ(1-p)(1+p+δ(1-p))]-(1-δ)(1-δ(1-p)2)/2 
 > C(1-δ)[1-pδ(2p-1)-δ(1-p)(1+p+δp(1-p))] 
if and only if 
 (pR/2)[1-δ+δ(1-p)(1-p-δ(1-p))]-(1-δ)(1-δ(1-p)2)/2 
 > C(1-δ)[1-δ+δp(1-p)(1-δ(1-p))] 
if and only if 
 pR(1+δ(1-p)2) > 2C[1-δ+δp(1-p)(1-δ(1-p))]+(1-δ(1-p)2).? 
 
Proof of Proposition 5:  (1) If p=1, we know from proposition 2 that M2 dominates M1.  It is easy to check 
that M11 and M2 are equivalent and equal to R/(1-δ) - 2C.  If λ = 1, then U2 = R/(1-δ) - C which clearly 
dominates.  If p < 1 but λ = 1,  U2 > M1, because πu2 = πm2 > πm1 and cu2 < cm1.  At λ = 1, U2 > M11 if and 
only if 
 [pR-C(1-δ)]/(1-δ)[1-δ(1-p)] > {pR(1+δ(1-p))-2C(1-δ)(1+δp(1-p))}/(1-δ)[1-δ(1-p)2] 
if and only if 
 (1-δ(1-p)2)(pR-C(1-δ)) > [1-δ(1-p)]{pR(1+δ(1-p))-2C(1-δ)(1+δp(1-p))} 
if and only if 
 pR{(1-δ(1-p)2)-[1-δ2(1-p)2]} > C(1-δ){(1-δ(1-p)2)-2(1+δp(1-p))(1-δ(1-p))} 
if and only if 
 -pRδ(1-p)2 > -C[1-δ(1-p)2(1+2δp)] 
if and only if 
 pRδ(1-p)2 < C[1-δ(1-p)2(1+2δp)]. 
We verify that 1 > δ(1-p)2(1+2δp) for all p and δ < 1.  Therefore, when C > C2 = pRδ(1-p)2/[1-δ(1-
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p)2(1+2δp)], U2 > M11 at λ = 1. 
(2) If λ is low enough, then U2 is dominated.  By Lemma 4, M1 dominates if and only if C > C1. 
(3) By Lemma 3, M11 always dominates M2.  By Proposition 2, M2 > M1 for p > p.  Therefore, M11 > M1 
for p > p . Again if λ is low enough, U2 is dominated.  The rest follows from Lemma 4.  Because M11, M1 
and M2 are independent of λ, for such p, M11 > U2 for low enough values of λ .  Similarly, because both 
M11 and M1 are independent of λ and, by Lemma 4, M11 dominates M1 for C < C1.  For any such C, U2 
goes to 0 when λ becomes small, then M11 also dominates U2 for λ low enough.  From the proof of (1), 
we know that M11 > U2 if λ = 1 and C < C2.? 
 
Proof of Lemma 5:  Because 
 (πm2 - πm1){1-δ[p(1-λ4k)+1-p]} = p{λ4k(R + δR/(1-δ) - (R+1)/2 - δπk} - (1-p)λ4k/2 
 = pλ4k[R/2 + δR/(1-δ) - δπk] + (-p-1+p)λ4k/2 
 = pλ4kδ[R/(1-δ) - πk] + λ4k(pR - 1)/2. 
Since πk = R/(1-δ) for k = 0 and decreases in k, πk ≤ R/(1-δ).  Therefore, as 1-δ[p(1-λ4k)+1-p] > 0 and pR 
> 1, πm2 > πm1.? 
 
Proof of Proposition 6:  (1) Given any λ < 1 and p, πu2 is independent of k and πm2 is a decreasing 
function of k.  For λ < 1, πm2 > πu2 at k = 0, therefore, such k* exists.  In particular, at p = 1, 
 πm2/πu2 = λ4k[(1-(1-λ2)δ]/λ2[1-(1-λ4k)]. 
Then k*(λ, 1) = 1/2. 
(2) We have: 
 πm2/πu2 = λ4k-2(1-(1-λ2)δ){1-δ[p(1-λ2)2+1-p]}/[1-δ(p(1-λ4k)+1-p)][1-(1-λ2)2δ], 
from which we derive: 
 d(πm2/πu2)/dp > 0  
if and only if 
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 - [1-δ(p(1-λ4k)+1-p)][(1-λ2)2-1] + [1-δ(p(1-λ2)2+1-p)][(1-λ4k)-1] > 0, 
if and only if 
 (1-δ)[(1-λ4k)-(1-λ2)2] > 0. 
Let k*(λ) be such that 1-λ4k*(λ) = (1-λ2)2, then 0 < k*(λ) < 1/2 and d(πm2/πu2)/dp > 0 if and only if k > 
k*(λ). 
 By part (1), at p = 1, πm2 > πu2 if and only if k < 1/2.  Then, for k > 1/2, πm2 < πu2 at p = 1, then 
d(πm2/πu2)/dp > 0 implies that πm2 < πu2 for all p.  For k*(λ) < k < 1/2, πm2 > πu2 at p = 1, then 
d(πm2/πu2)/dp > 0 implies that there exists p such that πm2 > πu2 for p > p* and πm2 < πu2 for p < p*.  For k 
< k*(λ), πm2 > πu2 at p = 1, then d(πm2/πu2)/dp < 0 implies that πm2 > πu2 for all p.? 
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